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Articles
PLURAL VISION: INTERNATIONAL LAW
SEEN THROUGH THE VARIED LENSES OF
DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION
D. A. Jeremy Telman∗
The essays collected in this Issue of the Valparaiso University Law
Review evolved from papers presented at a conference on “International
Law in the Domestic Context” held at the Valparaiso University School
of Law in April 2009. To some extent, the conference was a response to
the questions raised by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellín v. Texas1 and our collective curiosity about how other states deal
with tensions between international obligations and overlapping regimes
of national law.
In Medellín, the Supreme Court found that Texas was entitled to
ignore a ruling of the International Court of Justice (hereinafter “ICJ”) in
the Avena case.2 The Court thus permitted Texas to proceed with the
execution of a Mexican national who had not been given timely notice of
his right to consular notification and consultation in violation of the
United States’s obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.3 This ruling seemed to be in tension with two iconic
documents setting out the relationship of international law and domestic
law in the United States. First, the Medellín decision is hard to square
with the U.S. Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, which provides that
treaties shall be “supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
∗

Professor, Valparaiso University School of Law. The Author is grateful to: Professor
Penelope Andrews for her assistance in organizing the conference at which the papers
collected here were originally presented; to the Law School for its institutional support and
to its staff for their invaluable logistical and organizational support; and to the Law Review
editors both for their willingness to see the papers through to publication and for their
efforts in achieving that goal.
1
128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
2
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31).
3
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. no.
6820. See id. Art. 36(1)(b) (providing that, at the request of a foreign national criminal
defendant, “the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform
the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other
manner”). The ICJ found that the U.S. had violated its Article 36 obligations with respect to
Avena and other Mexican nationals, including Medellín. See Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 71–72, ¶
153 (finding, by a vote of fourteen to one, that the United States had violated its obligations
under Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (hereinafter “VCCR”)).
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shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”4 In addition, Medellín seems at
odds with the famous dictum from The Paquete Habana: “[i]nternational
law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.”5
Although it is tempting to conclude that Medellín was wrongly
decided, the reality is that our constitutional tradition speaks with many
voices on the subject of the relationship between domestic and
international law. In order to gain a broader perspective on that
relationship, we invited experts on foreign law to introduce us to the
way other states attempt to reconcile international commitments and the
domestic constitutional order.
Hans Kelsen’s monism offers a nifty solution to the problem of the
status of international law as domestic law. Kelsen believed that there
must be only one law if there is to be law at all and thus that domestic
law and international law must be part of one normative system. As
Kelsen explained in 1934, his “pure theory” of law recognized “that a
continuous sequence of legal structures, gradually merging into one
another, leads from the universal legal community of international law,
encompassing all states, to the legal communities incorporated into the
state.”6
Kelsen’s approach to the relation of international law and domestic
law makes sense. If domestic law were not subordinated to international
law but could trump it, states would routinely demand to be excused
from their international obligations based on superior domestic law.
Moreover, from Kelsen’s perspective, as a factual matter, international
law is higher law than domestic law, because it is only by virtue of the
recognition of state governments, as a matter of international law, that
domestic law preserves its monopoly on the domestic use of force.7 The
internationally recognized legitimacy of state government is what gives
that government’s regulations the force of law rather than of naked
power.
There is, however, a practical impediment to Kelsen’s monism. Even
in a monist world, there must be a legal process whereby international
law is operationalized as a part of domestic law. Even if we accept that

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
6
HANS KELSEN, INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF LEGAL THEORY 124 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley L. Paulson, trans. 1992).
7
See id. at 120 (contending that a state only has lawmaking authority because
international law empowers states to make law).
4
5
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international law is supreme law and should take precedence over any
contrary domestic law, there must still be a mechanism assuring that
supremacy. As Kelsen acknowledges, state law does not cease to be
valid law just because it contradicts international law until some
adjudicatory body strikes down or refuses to enforce the state law to the
extent of its inconsistency with the state’s international obligations.8
And so, even from a monist perspective, we need a mechanism for
securing the orderly implementation of international law in the domestic
order.
But the monist perspective is not the only perspective.
In
Commonwealth countries, for example, the dualist approach prevails.9
International law is not a part of the domestic legal order unless
implemented through national legislation.
It is clear from the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution that the Framers intended to
break with the Commonwealth approach. Having experienced the
inconveniences and embarrassments associated with having the
governments of the Colonies ignore the international obligations of the
national government under the Articles of Confederation, the Framers
made treaties Supreme Law of the Land and specified that treaty law
would trump state law and that state courts must give effect to U.S.
treaty commitments.10 Customary international law has likewise been
regarded as “a part of our law” since at least The Paquete Habana, but in
the post-Erie world, as Gwynne Skinner explores in her contribution to
this Issue,11 it is very difficult to identify exactly what part of our law it
is.12
See id. at 118 (noting that even an unconstitutional statute remains a valid statute until
overturned by a legal act).
9
See Dianne Otto, Protecting Human Rights and Countering Terrorism: Australia’s
Contradictory Approaches to Implementing Its International Legal Obligations, 44 VAL. U. L. REV.
911 (2010) (noting that that Australia has adopted a dualist approach); Gib van Ert, Dubious
Dualism: The Reception of International Law in Canada, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 927 (2010) (noting
that because English law does not repose law-making authority in the King, treaties can
only become domestic law through a legislative act).
10
See D. A. Jeremy Telman, Medellín & Originalism, 68 MD. L. REV. 377, 414–16 (2009)
(reviewing statements of the Framers regarding the purpose of the Supremacy Clause).
11
See Gwynne Skinner, Customary International Law, Federal Common Law and Federal
Court Jurisdiction, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 825, 835 (2010).
12
See Curtis Bradley, et al., Sosa, Customary International Law and the Continuing Relevance
of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 874 (2007) (arguing that after Erie, courts can implement
rules of customary international law “only in accordance with the requirements and
limitations of post-Erie federal common law”); Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Customary
International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815, 821 (1997) (criticizing what they characterize as the “recent ascendancy” of customary
international law as federal common law). The Supreme Court of the United States refused
to adopt this critique of the modern position. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692,
8
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While our constitutional design looks remarkably monist, that
design is counterbalanced by the judicially-created doctrine of selfexecution, according to which treaties are only automatically a part of
domestic law when they do not contemplate the need for legislative
enactment.13 The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín clearly rejects
any presumption that treaties are self-executing. On one reading of
Medellín, treaties that have domestic ramifications require congressional
implementing legislation, unless they make clear on their face the
parties’ intentions that they be non-self-executing.14
This doctrine of non-self-executing treaties may well be inconsistent
with the plain, textual meaning of the Supremacy Clause, and with the
express views of the Framers regarding the purpose of the Supremacy
Clause. However, the monist view may be inconsistent with other
aspects of the constitutional design. As others have pointed out, our
Constitution reposes the legislative power in Congress.15 Permitting
legislation by treaty would bypass the House of Representatives, which
seems inconsistent with the constitutional design.16 Moreover, since bills
that raise revenue must originate in the House of Representatives,17 it is
729 (ruling that Erie does not prevent federal courts from recognizing substantive rules
arising out of customary international law). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
dissented, endorsing Bradley and Goldsmith’s position. See id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(maintaining that federal courts have no power to recognize causes of action arising under
customary international law).
13
See United States v. Perchemen, 32 U.S. 51, 88–89 (1833) (finding a treaty self-executing
where it did not stipulate to the need for some future legislative act).
14
See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (requiring stipulations in the treaty
itself that its provisions require no legislative enactment). See also David J. Bederman,
Medellín's New Paradigm for Treaty Interpretation, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 529 (2008) (noting
that scholarly attention regarding the Medellín opinion had focused on “the Court’s
supposed ruling as to the presumptive non-self-execution of international agreements
entered into by the United States”); Julian G. Ku, Medellín's Clear Statement Rule: A
Solution for International Delegations, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 609, 615 (2008) (acknowledging
that Medellín might well be criticized for “departing from existing understandings of the
non-self-execution doctrine and imposing a new clear statement requirement”); Carlos
Manuel Vázquez, Less Than Zero?, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 563, 570 (2008) (noting several
statements in the majority opinion suggesting that treaties are presumptively non-selfexecuting). But see Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 541 (2008) (suggesting that Medellín is best understood as requiring a
treaty-by-treaty approach to the question of self-execution without resort to a general
presumption).
15
See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 1 (vesting all legislative powers “in a Congress of the United
States”).
16
See JOHN YOO, POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AFTER 9/11 215–49 (2005) (arguing that the constitutional design calls for the President to
take the lead in formulating foreign policy, but vests domestic lawmaking power in
Congress).
17
See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 7, cl. 1.
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hard to see how a self-executing treaty that required expenditures could
in fact be implemented without the support of both Houses of Congress.
Similarly, if the United States were to sign on to an international
agreement that created new international crimes, given the post-Erie
absence of general federal common law, such crimes could not become
part of our domestic law without some sort of legislative enactment.
Despite the monist overtones of the Supremacy Clause, as a product
of our constitutional history, the United States has a strong dualist
tradition as well. This tradition has recently been embodied in a school
of thought that I will call “sovereigntist,” because its proponents regard
state sovereignty as the fountainhead from which all law must derive.18
Soveigntism, of very different types, is represented in this Issue, in the
contributions of Robert Blomquist19 and Richard Stith.20 For Professor
Blomquist, international law poses a threat to the exercise of executive
authority to conduct U.S. foreign affairs, an authority that he believes
resides uniquely in the President.21 Professor Stith is an unusual type of
sovereigntist, in that he is not particularly interested in the protection of
U.S. sovereignty. His sympathies lie more with weaker states whose
unique and diverse legal, social, and cultural norms are in danger of

18
See Judith Resnik, The Internationalism of American Federalism: Missouri and Holland, 73
MO. L. REV. 1105, 1113–14 (2008) (defining sovereigntism as “a position insistent on a
nation’s right to define and delineate its own lawmaking”); Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and
the (Foreign Affairs) Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 654 & n.16 (2002) (characterizing
sovereigntism as “grounded in a general skepticism of international law and international
lawmaking processes”). Leading sovereigntists include academics such as Jeremy Rabkin,
Curtis Bradley, and Julian Ku, government officials such as John Bolton, and people who
have served as both scholars and government officials, such as John Yoo and Jack
Goldsmith. Examples of scholarship espousing a sovereigntist position include JACK L.
GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); JEREMY RABKIN,
LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? (2005); JEREMY RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY (2004); JEREMY
RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998); YOO, supra note 16; Curtis A. Bradley,
International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1557 (2003); John R. Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.
205 (2000); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New
Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71 (2000). As Julian Ku points out, at least
some sovereigntists object to the label. See Julian Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Lastin-Time Rule for Treaties and Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L. J. 319, 342 n. 121 (2005) (contending
that people characterized as “[s]overeigntists” are more interested in a critique of the
“internationalist” conception of international law than in developing a pro-sovereignty
ideology).
19
Robert Blomquist, The Jurisprudence of American National Security Presiprudence, 44 VAL.
U. L. REV. 881 (2010).
20
Richard Stith, If Dorothy Hadn’t Had Toto to Pull Back the Wizard’s Curtain: The
Fabrication of Human Rights as a World Religion, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 847 (2010).
21
See Blomquist, supra note 19, at 888 (arguing that courts should grant the President
“wide latitude” in reconciling national security and liberty).
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being subsumed within the homogeneity of the new “world religion,”
international human rights law.22
Initially it seems, supporters of national sovereignty and
independence should have no strong objection to the supremacy of
international law, since international law is based on consent, at least in
theory.23 In reality, there are elements of international law that do not
conform to the theory, including jus cogens norms,24 customary norms
when applied to new states that did not exist at the time of the norms’
formation,25 and new international criminal tribunals that could exercise
jurisdiction over the nationals of states that have not consented to such
jurisdiction.26 As Professor Stith’s paper highlights, international norms
and institutions sometimes purport to be law whether or not they are
endowed with the indicia of legitimacy identified by Thomas Franck—
right process and substantive fairness.27 Moreover, they might exercise
an imbalanced compliance pull28 on states powerless to resist the
powerful states that stand behind international legal norms (and
international economic assistance programs) while permitting
themselves to ignore such norms when they prove inconvenient.29
Given the tensions in our constitutional design, it is not surprising
that the domestic implementation of international obligations gives rise
to certain difficulties. However, as the papers in this Issue indicate, in its
22
See Stith, supra note 20, at 850 (characterizing international human rights law as a new
world religion in which forces of international domination are met on the domestic side—
at least in weaker states only by forces of surrender); id. (sympathetically citing a
newspaper ad denouncing the World Trade Organization for working to “undermine the
constitutional rights of sovereign nations”).
23
See Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115,
141 (2005) (“It is commonly observed that international law cannot bind states without
their consent, and notions of consent are often said to be the basis for [customary
international law].”).
24
See Laurence R. Hilfer, Nonconsensual International Lawmaking, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 71,
89 (2008) (noting that when international adjudicatory bodies recognize the peremptory
status of legal norms, they do not require evidence of state consent before finding states
bound).
25
Guzman, supra note 23, at 172–74 (offering a rational choice model to permit new
states to object to customary international law rules at the time of the states’ formation).
26
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 12 (1998), 37 ILM 999.
27
See THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 7–8 (1996)
(arguing that the legitimacy of legal rules turns on the processes through which they are
adopted and on the rules’ substantive fairness from the perspective of distributive justice).
28
“[C]ompliance pull” is Thomas Franck’s name for the “inherent pull power” toward
compliance that legal norms exercise and which Franck views as an “index of legitimacy.”
Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International System, 72 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 712 (1998).
29
See Stith, supra note 20, at 847–48 (contrasting U.S. dualism and superpower status
that preserves a democratic choice that is unavailable in countries such as Argentina and
Mexico where international law is directly effective and supreme).
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struggles with this particular legal and conceptual difficulty, the United
States is, for once, anything but exceptional. Nonetheless, there are
aspects of the law of the United States that are at least idiosyncratic. This
Issue sheds new light on those idiosyncrasies while also exploring the
difficulties of reconciling international obligations and the domestic legal
order.
The essays collected here were presented in three separate panels
during the conference. The organization of the volume follows the same
organizational principle. The first three papers thus focus on questions
relating to the implementation of international human rights as domestic
law. The two papers that follow address issues relating to international
obligations and national security law. The final section, which comprises
four papers, provides a comparative perspective on how international
law is introduced into the domestic legal systems of Australia, Canada,
China, and the United Kingdom.
*
*
*
The first three papers address the difficulties that the United States
and other countries face in the implementation of human rights law as
domestic law. One hurdle to U.S. participation in international legal
regimes is our federalism, because as Medellín illustrates, the federal
government cannot always compel the states to abide by international
obligations taken on by the federal government.30 Paul Finkelman’s
paper reminds us that in the ante-bellum period, “American states
treated each other as ‘foreign entities’” and “often refused to recognize
and give comity to the laws of other states.”31 Moreover, Professor
Finkelman cites to both the Alien Tort Statute32 and to the frequent
citation to foreign law in early U.S. cases as evidence that international
and foreign law have always been a part of our law.33
But Professor Finkelman’s more surprising argument is that in the
ante-bellum period, the several states regarded the laws of other U.S.
states no differently from the way they regarded the law of foreign

See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (finding that because none of the
treaties at issue in Medellín create binding federal law in the absence of implementing
legislation and that no such legislation exists and that decisions by the International Court
of Justice do not create binding federal law that could overcome the state bar to successive
habeas petitions, Texas may proceed with the execution of Medellín notwithstanding the
fact that such an execution would place the United States in violation of its international
obligations).
31
Paul Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 779
(2010).
32
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
33
Finkelman, supra note 31, at 779–80.
30
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states. In that context, the Supreme Court of the United States often
resorted to international law concepts to settle conflicts among states or
between citizens of separate states.34 Professor Finkelman’s contribution
also illustrates how race was often at the center of the development of
U.S. doctrines relating to inter-state comity and choice of law.
The United States’ unique Alien Tort Statute is another ingredient of
U.S. law that renders idiosyncratic the U.S approach to the problem of
international law as a part of the domestic order. The Alien Tort Statute
has been at the center of litigation that has attempted—through the
disorderly and ad hoc process that is the stuff of common law
adjudication—to specify the status of customary international law within
our domestic legal order.35 As Professor Skinner points out, scholars are
divided into two camps—the modernist and revisionist positions—on
the issue.36
Professor Skinner intervenes forcefully in this debate with an essay
that consults eighteenth and nineteenth century sources of law.
Pinpointing the status of customary international law turns out to be a
difficult task because, although the Supreme Court has stated that U.S.
law “recognized” what then was called the “law of nations” at the time
of the Founding,37 it was not recognized as part of general federal
common law at the time because that body of law did not emerge until
later in the nineteenth century.38 While Professor Skinner notes that
there are strong arguments on both sides of the academic debate
regarding whether customary international law was part of the law of
the United States for the purposes of Article III of the Constitution, she
concludes that the contemporary disagreement reflects similar
disagreements that raged throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. In fact, she argues that the debate over the status of customary
international law was a product of larger debates regarding the

Id. at 783–84.
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (addressing Alien Tort Statute
claim brought by a Mexican national alleging unlawful detention in Mexico by a Mexican
national); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (rejecting an
Alien Tort Statute claim by survivors of a terror attack perpetrated by foreign nationals in
Israel); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing Alien Tort Statute
claim brought by a Paraguayan national whose brother had been tortured and killed by
Paraguayan police).
36
See Skinner, supra note 11, at 829–30 (identifying modernists as those who believe that
federal law incorporates customary international law either in whole or in part and
revisionists as those who believe that, post-Erie, federal incorporation of custom requires a
legislative act).
37
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
38
Skinner, supra note 11, at 832.
34
35
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relationship of the federal government and the states within our federal
system.39
Professor Skinner nonetheless argues that customary international
law, or at least some aspects of it, is included in the “‘laws of the United
States’” for the purposes of creating federal jurisdiction under Article III
of the U.S. Constitution and that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 also grants federal
courts jurisdiction over federal common law doctrines that incorporate
or recognize customary international law.40 She thus navigates a middle
ground between the modern and revisionist positions on the status of
customary international law as “part of our law,” arguing that only
customary rules “recognized” under general federal common law can
give rise to claims in federal courts.41
While these first two contributions focus on the domestic
mechanisms, such as constitutional principles, comity, or the Alien Tort
Statute, for recognizing international human rights law or humanitarian
principles as part of our law, Professor Stith’s paper introduces a stirring
antidote to what might be described as international human rights law
triumphalism. Compared with developing nations forced to surrender
to the new prophets of the new world religion, as Professor Stith
describes them, the United States is rather well-defended when it comes
to resisting the universalizing impulses of international law. Hence, the
original panel’s concern with how best to implement international
human rights law in the domestic context evidences an “American
parochialism.”42 Professor Stith suggests that resistance to universal
human rights may be a necessary means of preserving a fruitful and
blessed diversity, not only in the U.S., but globally.
Professor Stith problematizes the international human rights
movement on a number of levels, but his most sweeping argument is
that rights are, by their very nature, anti-democratic.43 But Professor
Stith’s real concern is with positive rights; that is, rights that the state has
a positive duty to protect, as opposed to negative rights, which require
only that the state leave us alone.44 The problems that Professor Stith
identifies are best represented in General Comment 15 on the right to
water, which the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
promulgated in 2002.45 Professor Stith characterizes the Committee as a
Id. at 833.
Id. at 839–41.
41
Id. at 844–46.
42
Stith, supra note 20, at 847.
43
Id. at 850.
44
Id. at 856–57.
45
EC.12/2002/11, 20 Jan. 2003, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/
a5458d1d1bbd713fc1256cc400389e94/$FILE/G0340229.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).
39
40
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non-representative body of non-lawyers that has promulgated a
document that seeks through legal language to bind states to protect a
positive right to water that is not expressly mentioned in any
international agreement. The Committee’s Comment is effective, says
Professor Stith, not because it is backed up by the threat of force but
because it is “backed up with guilt and shame for those who refuse to
comply.”46 For Professor Stith, the oracular quality of the
pronouncements of international bodies creates dynamics more akin to
religious than to legal discourse.47
Professor Stith raises significant and familiar objections relating to
international law’s notorious “democracy deficit.”48 In considering how
to address those objections, it is important to note, especially in the
context of a volume on the domestic implementation of international law
that those who decry the democracy deficit in international law greatly
exaggerate the extent to which international law is distinct from
domestic law in this respect.
At least within the United States, people regard international law
with suspicion for the same reason they are wary of (or think they are
wary of) activist judges. They think of courts and of international law as
elite (or at least non-populist), unaccountable because unelected
(although state courts now are largely elected by people who have no
idea who they are voting for), and alien. International law is alien for
obvious reasons; courts are alien because they use a technical jargon and
decide cases on grounds other than the merits that are completely
opaque to the non-lawyer.
In fact, however, our supposedly democratically accountable
branches of government are not much more so than are courts. As far as
our House of Representatives is concerned (the so-called “People’s
House”), because of gerrymandering, it is far more accurate to say that
our politicians choose their constituents than the other way ’round.49
Stith, supra note 20, at 857.
Dianne Otto points out that, at least in Australia, international attempts at shaming
the government into adopting human rights protections through domestic measures have
fallen on deaf ears. Otto, supra note 9, at 916.
48
Stith, supra note 20, at 851 n.10.
49
See Reelection Rates of Incumbents in the U. S. House By Congress and by State,
http://www.thirty-thousand.org/documents/QHA-08.pdf (last visited March 20, 2009)
(finding that rates of return in the House of Representatives easily exceed 90% for members
who seek re-election); Richard L. Hall, Equalizing Expenditures in Congressional Campaigns: A
Proposal, 6 ELECTION L.J. 145, 148 (2007) (noting that even in 2006, a year of dramatic party
reversal, 94% of Senators and House Members who sought re-election won). On the use of
political gerrymandering to protect incumbents or to deprive incumbents of their safe seats,
see generally Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab: When does gerrymandering become a
threat to democracy?, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 8, 2003).
46
47
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And once they have chosen their districts, members of the House have to
devote much of their two-year terms to securing re-election rather than
to legislating.50 Things are better in the Senate, but only by degree, not
by an order of magnitude, and their six-year terms render Senators only
slightly more accountable than judges.51 Presidents may of course be
turned out of office, but they are never turned out of office for one bad
decision in particular, while judges are often vilified for upholding laws
that passed unnoticed when enacted by a legislature.52 In any case, the
real power is not in passing legislation but in drafting it, and for the most
part the people who do so are either unelected and unaccountable
specialists within the executive branch, unelected and unaccountable
legislative aids, or unelected and unaccountable lobbyists.
There is no doubt that international law faces challenges not only of
democracy deficit but also of transparency. But here again, international
institutions are not qualitatively different from national institutions.
Because of the well-documented tendency of the executive branch to
expand the scope of classified documents, there has been a huge increase
in the portion of our executive branch that is completely inaccessible to
the voting public.53 A much larger portion of it is technically accessible
but in reality just as hidden because keeping tabs on specialized
executive agencies is more than a full-time job. Legislatures are no better
of course, as they routinely pass important legislation without reading
50
See Peter Francia & Paul Herrnson, The Impact of Public Finance Laws on Fundraising in
State Legislative Elections, 31 AM. POL. RES. 520, 531 (2003) (finding that Members of
Congress spend on average 34% of their time in office raising funds for re-election).
STEVEN S. SMITH, ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 7 (4th ed. 2005) (estimating that the
average Representative raises $10,000 per week over a two-year term and that the average
Senator raises $22,000 per week over a six-year term); Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying in the
21st Century—Reciprocity and the Need for Reform, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 744 (2006)
(observing that most Members of Congress therefore spend most of their time raising
money).
51
Compare Judith Resnik, So Long, LEGAL AFFAIRS 20, 21 (July/August 2005) (finding that
the average tenure in office for federal judges who have retired in the last two decades has
been about twenty-four years), with ROGER H. DAVIDSON, ET AL., CONGRESS AND ITS
MEMBERS (2008) (finding that the average tenure in office for Senators is approaching
sixteen years).
52
E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding a law that had
passed unnoticed when enacted by the legislature).
53
According to the National Archives’ Information Security Oversight Office, which is
empowered pursuant to 32 C.F.R. § 2001 (2010) to collect yearly statistics on classification
and declassification of materials from any agency “that creates or handles classified
information,” the number of classified documents increased from 8.65 million in 2001 to
23.1 million in 2007. See Meredith Fuchs, Judging Secrets: The Role Courts Should Play in
Preventing Unnecessary Secrecy, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 131, 133–34 (2006) (noting that
government officials frequently admit that far more material is declared “classified” than is
really necessary for national security purposes).
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it.54 This is inevitably true because of the sheer length of omnibus
legislation and because of the byzantine amendment process that
inevitably causes bills to morph and grow on their way to adoption.
Compared with our domestic political institutions international
bodies may have a tremendous discursive advantage. Their deliberations
may be private, at least in part, but there is always significant
opportunity for public comment and criticism, and the reasoning
underlying statements of international adjudicatory or treaty bodies,
warts and all, is presented in public documents that are subject to
criticism and resistance.
Thus, expanding on Professor Stith’s critique of rights and of
international human rights, we might pose the same sorts of questions
with respect to the domestic legal order. Domestic courts might very
well view the Alien Tort Statute, that “legal Lohengrin”55 with the same
sort of suspicion which we ordinarily reserve for foreign and
international law. While we are at it, we can look at other domestic
institutions that touch on human rights and that are neither
constitutional nor democratic in nature, such as: Presidential signing
statements, which can gut legislation seeking to force the executive to
abide by international human rights instruments; the Totten doctrine and
the state secrets privilege, which can shield the executive from liability
even for constitutional violations provable through publicly-available
evidence; sole executive and legislative-executive agreements, which
account for over 90% of the United States’ international agreements and
skirt the Senate’s constitutional treaty powers; and the reservations,
understandings, and declarations that the Senate attaches to the rare
treaty submitted for its advice and consent.
*
*
*
Our second set of essays address foreign affairs and national security
concerns, and there we begin with a return to the subject of federalism,
as explored in Michael Granne’s essay.56 One of the interesting oddities
of the Medellín case, to which I alluded earlier, is that it could be read as
requiring the acquiescence of the federal government, represented
strenuously by the executive branch, in a foreign policy decision made
See Ittai Bar-Siman Tov, Legislative Supremacy in the United States?: Rethinking the
‘Enrolled Bill’ Doctrine, 97 GEO. L.J. 323, 338–39 (2009) (reporting that ominbus legislation is
“often passed by Congress via all-night sessions under tight deadlines, without any notice
or time for members to read or understand them”).
55
See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (calling the Alien Tort Statute
a legal Lohengrin because nobody knows “whence it came”).
56
Michael Aaron Granne, Two-Dimensional Federalism and Foreign Affairs Preemption, 44
VAL. U. L. REV. 863 (2010).
54
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by a state court in Texas.57 Professor Granne notes that Medellín is just
one in a long line of cases in which the courts have wrestled with the
question of foreign affairs preemption. In Professor Granne’s view, the
courts have not articulated a principled approach to preemption in this
area and the resulting case law does not appear to be internally
consistent.
Professor Granne argues that courts’ approaches have seemed
incoherent because courts fail to adequately appreciate that conflicts
between state and federal interests in foreign affairs can be understood
as inhabiting three different paradigms, each of which requires a
different approach to the weighing of the state and federal interests
implicated. The first paradigm, for which Zschernig v. Miller58 is
emblematic, is often called “dormant foreign affairs preemption,” in
which federal law automatically displaces any state law that interferes
with foreign affairs powers entrusted to the federal government alone.59
Second, we have what Professor Granne calls “obstacle preemption.”
This arises when state action presents an obstacle to the accomplishment
of congressional goals. The emblematic cases illustrating this paradigm
are Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council,60 in which the Supreme Court
struck down a Massachusetts law that was at odds with congressional
sanctions against the state of Burma (Myanmar), and American Insurance
Association v. Garamendi,61 in which the Supreme Court struck down
California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act.62 Finally, there may
be cases where a congressional statement of intent to preempt state law
could be required.63
Professor Granne applies recent scholarship differentiating between
vertical and horizontal federalism in order to provide a more coherent
basis for foreign affairs preemption. Vertical federalism describes
situations when federal uniformity concerns justify permitting federal
law to trump state law. Horizontal federalism describes situations in
which there is a need to coordinate state activities, as in the area of
environmental protection. While foreign affairs might seem like a classic
case for vertical federalism, Professor Granne argues that elements of

Telman, supra note 10, at 385 (noting that the Medellín majority permitted a state court
in Texas to determine U.S. foreign policy over the strong objections of the executive
branch).
58
389 U.S. 429 (1968).
59
Granne, supra note 56, at 866.
60
530 U.S. 363 (2000).
61
537 U.S. 1100 (2003).
62
Granne, supra note 56, at 868.
63
Id. at 868–69.
57
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horizontal federalism also ought to inform our foreign affairs
preemption doctrine.64
Some state actions implicate foreign affairs but do not create any
significant tensions with federal control of foreign affairs. Examples of
such state actions include cultural and educational exchanges and trade
agreements between individual states and foreign nations. With respect
to this category, Professor Granne’s model would require federal
preemption only when specifically called for by federal statute or
treaty.65 The second category is state policies, such as “Buy American
Statutes,” which give rise to non-trivial interference with federal
uniformity concerns in the area of free trade. Here, Professor Granne
argues, the obstacle preemption approach is appropriate.66 Finally, there
are state statutes that single out some foreign government for sanction.
These statutes implicate both the uniformity concerns associated with
vertical federalism and the coordination problems associated with
horizontal federalism. To such cases, Professor Granne argues, the
dormant foreign affairs preemption approach is best suited.67 Professor
Granne’s paper thus offers an elegant solution that makes sense of a
confusing tangle of related cases.
The thread that unites our two papers that address national security
issues is the question of the role of courts in adjudicating disputes
relating to foreign affairs. While Professor Granne develops a nuanced
preemption doctrine that recognizes the competing interests of the
several states and the branches of the federal government, Professor
Blomquist focuses on the institutional competence of the executive
branch and thus argues for judicial deference to the foreign affairs
powers of the President, whom he characterizes as “the national security
sentinel with vast, but not unlimited, powers to protect the Nation from
hostile, potentially catastrophic, threats.”68 Because of the President’s
vastly superior store of knowledge and expertise, Professor Blomquist
argues that courts should not question executive national security
decisions “unless clearly necessary to counterbalance an indubitable
violation of the text of the Constitution.”69 Professor Blomquist also
stakes out a position against the use of foreign law as legal precedent,
especially when a U.S. court is reviewing the executive’s determinations

64
65
66
67
68
69

Id. at 869.
Id. at 876–80.
Id.
Id.
Blomquist, supra note 19, at 885.
Id.
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relating to national security, a field for which Professor Blomquist has
created a handy term, “presiprudence.”70
Professor Blomquist’s position, opposing the use of foreign law, is
uncontroversial, and in fact Professor Blomquist cites to no case in which
a U.S. court has ever relied on foreign law as precedent.71 The
consequences of his position on presiprudence with respect to
international law are, by contrast, potentially explosive. For example,
Professor Blomquist follows Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, who
argue that the United States should only abide by its international
obligations under the laws of war when the U.S. benefits from such
compliance, taking into account the possible reputational costs of noncompliance.72 This position clearly informed the Department of Justice
during the George W. Bush administration, but it was rejected by that
administration’s Department of State.73 This conflict between two
agencies within the same executive branch complicates the logic of
presiprudence and also, as I have argued elsewhere,74 renders dubious
the executive branch’s claims to superior expertise in matters of foreign
affairs. If the President chooses the opinions of his highly politicized and
in part non-expert Office of Legal Counsel over those of his highly
professionalized legal advisors within the Department of State on
matters of international law, the executive branch must abandon its
argument that courts should defer to the executive branch’s superior
expertise.
*
*
*
Our final set of papers introduces us to the dynamic regarding the
implementation of international law as domestic law in Australia, the
United Kingdom, Canada, and China. In those countries, as here, the
70
Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
439 (2008).
71
See Blomquist, supra note 19, at 892 n.55 (citing only a hypothetical reliance by federal
judges on foreign law as precedent).
72
Id. at 889.
73
Compare John C. Yoo & Robert J. Delahunty, Memorandum for William J. Haynes II,
11–42 (Jan. 9, 2002) (arguing that the President is not bound either by treaty law or by
customary international law with respect to the conduct of the War on Terror in
Afghanistan), available at http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20020109.pdf
(last visited Oct. 3, 2009), with William H. Taft IV, Memorandum to John C. Yoo, 1 (Jan. 11,
2002) (arguing that “[i]nternal law does not support key conclusions” in the
Yoo/Delahunty memorandum).
74
See D. A. Jeremy Telman, The Foreign Affairs Power: Does the Constitution Matter? 80
TEMP. L. REV. 245, 277–78 (2007) (pointing out that the same argument, made by John Yoo,
is hard to square with Yoo’s career in the Justice Department, in which he frequently and
successfully persuaded the White House to ignore expert advice coming from the
Department of State).
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picture is more complicated than the simple choice of monism or
dualism might suggest. But these cases contain insights into foreign
practices that provide useful perspectives on our own. For example, the
first contribution in this final set of four, from Jim Kennan,75 includes a
discussion of judicial views of deference to the executive branch in
national security cases, that provides a startling contrast to the position
set out in Professor Blomquist’s essay.
Mr. Kennan’s discussion of the case law from the United Kingdom
culminates with some excerpts on the subject of deference to executive
authority from the Belmarsh case, which was decided in the House of
Lords in 2004.76 In rejecting sweeping claims to executive expertise in
national security matters, the Law Lords referenced the skepticism
“which has attached to intelligence assessments since the fiasco over
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction,” and suggested that such faulty
assessments were to blame for the participation of the military forces of
the United Kingdom in Iraq.77 They also declared that terrorism, while
“hideous” and “serious,” does not pose an existential threat. Rather, the
threat arises from our own responses to terror.78 Indian courts echo this
view that courts must protect human rights even in times of national
crisis.79 The Kantian dictum, fiat justicia ruat caelum, seems to have
retained much of its original force.
Turning to his native Australia, Jim Kennan notes that Australia has
no constitutional protections of individual rights akin to our Bill of
Rights, nor does it automatically incorporate international human rights
obligations into domestic law. Rather, Australia seems to have a canon
of interpretation much like our own, that statutes should be construed to
be consistent with international obligations absent a clear statement to
the contrary.80 But unlike the United Kingdom, Australia is reluctant to
address human rights concerns on any basis other than the common
law.81 Mr. Kennan’s conclusion is clear: the English approach is
preferable.82 But his essay holds out hope for human rights in Australia.
It is to be found not in the common law, nor in the customary law of

Jim Kennan, The Role of International Human Rights Law in Australian Law, 44 VAL. U. L.
REV. 895 (2010).
76
Id. at 903–07.
77
Id. at 906.
78
Id.
79
Id. at 907.
80
Id. at 895–96; see also Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains . . . .”).
81
Kennan, supra note 75, at 896–903.
82
Id. at 908–09.
75

http://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss3/1

Telman: Plural Vision: International Law Seen through the Varied Lenses

2010]

Plural Vision

775

nations but in the common sense of Australian jurors willing “to stand
back from the war on terror rhetoric which has so dominated public
discussion since 2001.”83
Dianne Otto’s piece picks up where Jim Kennan’s left off,
acknowledging Australia’s insistence on protecting human rights only
through domestic enactments. But she then picks up on some of the
themes of Richard Stith’s paper, although in a completely different
register, expressing concern that Security Council resolutions aimed at
countering international terrorism might give rise to a new hegemonic
international law.84 Professor Otto tells what for U.S. lawyers is a fairly
familiar narrative in which national pride in one’s own domestic
protections of civil rights, coupled with distrust of judicial processes
forms the basis for opposition to the implementation of international
treaty obligations.85 In fact, Professor Otto suggests that the response of
the conservative Howard government to criticisms of its human rights
record was “reminiscent of the United States’ exceptionalist claims.”86
However, Professor Otto notes the contrast between Australia’s
reluctance to implement international human rights protections and its
“eagerness to implement its international legal obligations” relating to
post-9/11 Security Council resolutions, especially Resolution 1373.87
This resolution was remarkable for the swiftness with which it was
adopted and for its sweeping nature. Unlike previous Security Council
resolutions, Resolution 1373 does not call for temporary measures
addressing a specific threat to international peace and security.
Unfortunately, despite its legislative quality, Resolution 1373 bears “the
opaqueness and exclusivity” that are the hallmark of executive
enactments and of the Security Council’s protocols more generally.88
Pursuant to Resolution 1373, Australia enacted legislation creating
enhanced police and surveillance powers modeled on the USA Patriot
Act of 2001.89 This is international law-making at its most muscular, and
it is undertaken by a body that Professor Otto describes as “patently
unrepresentative, un-consultative, and lacking in transparency and
accountability.”90
Despite her disappointment with Australia’s record on human rights
and its willingness to toe the line when it comes to Security Council
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

Id. at 909.
Otto, supra note 9, at 911–12.
Id. at 912–13.
Id. at 916.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920.
Id. at 923.
Id.
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directives on national security issues, Professor Otto concludes by
stressing the need for all states to recognize the universality of human
rights.91 The problem is not that international law is brought into the
domestic process but that this occurs through hegemonic law rather than
through what she calls the “participatory international law-making
processes” involving both states and civil society.92
Gib van Ert’s contribution to this Issue begins with a simple
syllogism: under Canadian law, only the executive can make treaties
and the executive cannot make law; therefore, treaties are not law.93 In
principle, Canadian law does not suffer from the ambiguities that led to
the Medellín case: all treaties require legislative implementation in order
to be part of the Canadian domestic legal order.94 But Canada is not a
pure dualist system; it too is a hybrid in which customary international
law is directly incorporated into common law and in which judicial
interpretation can give direct effect to treaties as well.95 In addition, in
developing and interpreting domestic human rights norms, Canadian
attorneys and courts are free to refer to—and even to rely on—legal
norms that arise in foreign and international contexts.96 Moreover,
Canadian courts would appear to be even less deferential to executive
interpretations of international and treaty law than are their counterparts
in the United Kingdom.97
Mr. van Ert’s discussion of Canada’s incorporation doctrine,
whereby rules of customary international law are directly incorporated
into domestic law, is especially instructive. Based on the academic
uproar about the modernist and revisionist positions discussed above,98
one would think that opportunities to give direct effect to international
custom arise all the time. As Mr. van Ert notes, they almost never arise,
because: (1) customary rules generally govern state behavior and thus
rarely have relevance to domestic legal issues; and (2) it is very difficult
to prove that a rule of custom exists.99 Were it not for the Alien Tort
Statute, U.S. courts likely would have little reason to ponder the status of
customary international law as part of our law.
Equally instructive is Mr. van Ert’s discussion of the Canadian
approach to treaties. Because Canadian courts presume that legislation
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Id. at 924.
Id. at 925.
van Ert, supra note 9, at 927.
Id. at 927–28.
Id.
Id. at 929.
Id. at 930.
See supra text accompanying notes 35–41.
van Ert, supra note 9, at 931.
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was intended to conform to Canada’s international obligations, absent
evidence of “unequivocal legislative intent to default,” statutes are
interpreted with the aid of treaty law.100 As a result, despite its
seemingly pure dualism, Canada arrives at a position not unlike that of
the United States’ “last in time” doctrine, in which subsequent legislation
trumps treaty obligations only if the two cannot be reconciled. A statute
is thus interpreted so as to place the United States in violation of its
treaty obligations only if Congress, in enacting the statute, expressed its
clear and unequivocal desire to do so.101
In the final essay in our collection, Zou Keyuan provides a sweeping
history of the status of international law in China, the only non-commonlaw country addressed in this Issue.102 Of the countries surveyed, China
seems to be closest to the monist model, since Chinese law provides that
China’s international obligations supersede any contrary domestic
law.103 However, Chinese scholars view the Chinese approach as a
modified form of dualism, which acknowledges the separate existence of
the two types of law and does not establish a hierarchical relationship
between them.104
Regardless how one characterizes the Chinese
approach on a theoretical level, Chinese practice, as described by
Professor Zou, is exemplary. When China takes on a new international
obligation, it implements that obligation through legislation, and it alters
existing laws and regulations to bring domestic law into conformity with
the new international standard.105 And, as do courts in the U.S. and
Canada, Chinese courts interpret statutes wherever possible so as to
reconcile domestic and international law.106
However, when it comes to the implementation of human rights
norms, China’s practice is less exemplary. Professor Zou’s extended
discussion of the Chinese practice of re-education through labor
(hereinafter “RTL”) illustrates one area in which China’s domestic
policies are not in conformity with international standards. China’s RTL
policies do not place it in violation of any treaties that it has ratified, but
they are inconsistent, says Professor Zou, with China’s having signed
van Ert, supra note 9, at 932.
See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(finding that courts are “under a duty to interpret statutes in a manner consonant with
existing treaty obligations,” unless Congress had “clearly and unequivocally exercised” its
power to abrogate the United States’s international obligations).
102
Zou Keyuan, International Law in the Chinese Domestic Context, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 935
(2010).
103
See id. at 938 (noting that under China’s Civil Law, if China ratifies a treaty that is
inconsistent with domestic law, the international legal rules govern).
104
Id. at 937–38.
105
Id. at 937–39.
106
Id. at 938–40.
100
101
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(but not yet ratified) the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and with non-binding human rights declarations to which China
is a party.107
The role of courts in implementing international law in the domestic
context in China is equally unclear. Professor Zou reports that they have
had occasion to do so only rarely and their practice has been
inconsistent. While some courts have applied international law in
certain commercial and maritime contexts, there is some authority for
the position that international human rights treaties may not be given
direct effect under Chinese law.108
*
*
*
I began this introductory essay with a discussion of the monist and
dualist approaches to the question of the incorporation of international
law as domestic law. In this area, as in so many areas, the Holmesian
dictum applies: the life of the law has been not logic but experience.109
Programmatic statements in founding documents or in law review
articles will not determine the status of international law in the domestic
context. It is to be worked out through the various legal histories of each
state. As each state grapples to reconcile its national legal traditions with
its international obligations, it is worthwhile to pause and consider the
experiences of others. It is our hope that this Issue contributes to that
process.

Id. at 946–50.
Id. at 950–56.
109
See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) (“The life of the law has not
been logic: it has been experience.”).
107
108
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